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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effectiveness and The Goals of Foreign Aid: An Empirical Examination of Sectoral 
Aid’s Influence on Mitigating Conflicts and Violence. (August 2012) 
Yu Zhang, B.A., Renmin University of China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David A. Bessler 
   
The objectives of foreign aid are closely associated with the global political and 
economic issues during the last 60 years. In recent years foreign aid flows have been 
considerably influenced by international terrorism. In this paper I attempt to investigate 
whether and how sectoral aid has affected international conflicts and intra-country 
violence.  
   The analysis is initiated by case studies. I use graphical analysis to examine the 
rationale and disbursements of sectoral foreign aid to Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 to 
2010. It is discovered that aid for agriculture and food are extremely low in these 
conflict areas. Then I use a comprehensive panel data to show the relationships between 
conflicts/violence and sectoral foreign aid covering 123 developing countries from 2002 
to 2010. It shows that agricultural aid can significantly reduce conflict, and aid for food 
security can significantly mitigate violence. Aid for some sectors will increase 
conflict/violence. Finally I use directed acyclic graphs (DAG) to present preliminary 
results on the structure of causality among conflicts/violence and sectoral aid, showing 
that aid to government is positively associated with both conflict and violence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
Foreign aid, which is also called foreign assistance, development assistance, or 
international aid, is defined by the Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia as “economic, 
military, technical, and financial assistance given on an international, and usually 
intergovernmental level…Aid may be given as a grant, with no repayment obligation, or 
a loan, and often comes with conditions that require that the recipient nation purchase 
goods or services with the aid from the donor nation.”(Columbia Electronic 
Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 2011). While the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) presents another definition, saying that foreign aid includes 
“grants and loans to developing countries and territories which are: (i) undertaken by the 
official sector of the donor country, (ii) with the promotion of economic development 
and welfare in the recipient country as the main objective and (iii) at concessional 
financial terms” (Hjertholm and White, 2000). The main difference between these two 
definitions is whether to include military aid in foreign aid. In thesis I employ the second 
definition since it’s accepted by more researchers.  
    From 1956 to 2006, the amount of foreign aid allocated is larger than $2.3 trillion 
dollars at the 2006 price (Easterly, 2006). Recently Shah (2012) reviewed foreign aid 
situation at the global level, stating that rich countries of the OECD have donated 0.2%-
0.4% of their GNP (now GNI) as aid to developing countries since 1970, that is to say,  
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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some &150 billion short per year. He also mentioned that the amount of foreign aid  
maintains an upward trend during the past 10 years, despite the economy loss in 2009 
due to the financial crisis. 
There exists evidence of foreign aid in antiquity. The modern issue of foreign aid was 
originated with Britain in the 19th and early 20th centuries, based on studies of 
Hjertholm and White (2000) and Kanbur (2003). At that time the Britain government 
provided development assistance to colonial governments, in order to improve bilateral 
relationships and stimulate the colonial economies and their demand for British exports. 
After World War II, aid doctrine was widely accepted and used by United States and 
other countries. The Marshall Plan, as well as the establishments of United Nations, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund played important roles for the 
expansion of aid doctrine. During the Cold War, foreign aid was used by the western 
countries and the Soviet as a weapon in the ideological war, drawn plenty of critiques on 
its inefficiency. In 1970, rich countries of the OECD agreed at the United Nations 
(Resolution 2626) to give 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) as aid to the 
developing countries. During the same period, Regional Development Banks were 
started in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These multilateral organizations along with 
World Bank expanded multilateral aid, with advantages of better handling the 
coordination of a multitude of individual aid programs. The aid doctrine was changed in 
1980’s, instead of “ideological weapon”, development aid was provided to support the 
“import substitution” strategies of developing countries, often conditioned on policy 
reform that conformed to the objectives of the “Washington Consensus.”Throughout the 
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1990's, foreign aid was mainly allocated for the transition to market economies of the 
formerly communist economies, as well as the poor countries whose populations 
suffered through the East Asian financial crisis in 1997.From 2001 the United States has 
been the largest donor of aid. No doubt that the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 
created renewed interest in U.S. foreign aid. The U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have again brought attention to U.S. foreign aid policy. For example, reconstruction 
costs in Iraq now exceed all other U.S. foreign aid spending (Belasco, 2011). 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
As we discussed above, the objectives of foreign aid are not certain. Kanbur (2003) 
argued that the fundamental aid policy for rich countries is to trade for support from poor 
countries in the geopolitics, for example in the "war on terror" era, the rich countries 
such as U.S. need allies and may find them among poor countries by providing 
development aid. Contrast with Kanbur, Lumsdaine (1993) presented a relatively 
idealistic view of foreign aid aims, emphasizing that humanitarian concern in the rich 
countries formed the main basis of support for aid, instead of donor's political and 
economic interests. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2011) pointed out that foreign aid includes 
non-developmental goals related to democracy. But they found a negative relationship 
between aid and democracy, especially in unfavorable environments for democracy. A 
more comprehensive summary of the objectives of foreign was given by Shahriar 
(2011). He offered a broad survey of the literature from the 2000's onward. His 
conclusion reflects the recent opinions of researchers (Easterly, 2004, 2007; Moyo, 
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2009; Azam, 2004, 2006; Svensson, 2000; Sachs, 2006), claiming that there are five key 
objectives: eradicating poverty; enhancing livelihoods of the impoverished in developing 
countries so that they can achieve equal terms of trade; creating a political hegemony; 
maintaining a sound diplomatic relationship; and ensuring international peace and 
harmony. Regarding to poor countries, the last three objectives are directly or indirectly 
related to the mitigation of conflict and violence. Especially under the leadership of 
President George W. Bush, U.S. government presented the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) after September 11 terrorist attacks, claiming that the threat of global 
poverty and international terrorism were considered as the greatest challenges facing 
humanity in the 21th century (Owusu, 2004). 
    As discussed above, donor countries deliver resources to recipient countries for some 
reasons. However, is the aid positive or negative for the recipients? Morgenthau (1962) 
was probably the first researcher to assess the effectiveness of foreign aid after the 
Marshall Plan. Morgenthau claimed that medical and agricultural aid may benefit 
recipient countries. He also cautioned policy makers about spending too many resources 
on government administration and civil society sector in an effort to promote Western 
political values in developing countries. Samuelson (1951) and Sachs (2005) suggested 
that people in poor countries are so poor that they cannot save for the capital formation, 
unless they obtain external assistance.  On the contrary, Bauer (1972) described the 
dismal performance of foreign aid during cold war, criticizing inappropriate and 
inefficient aid destroys economic incentives and leads to misallocation of scarce 
resources in developing countries. Easterly (2006) mentioned that foreign aid had 
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brought about little improvement in the lot of the world's poor, due to the World Bank 
and the IMF's politically and institutionally dysfunctional. 
A high-profile literature with empirical studies concerns foreign aid effectiveness in 
promoting economic growth and reducing poverty in recipient countries. Some 
researchers show that foreign aid has been conditionally effective in improving 
development. For example, Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggested that foreign aid is 
only successful in countries with good policies and governance. Bearce and Tirone 
(2010) presented another condition for aid to be effective on welfare promotion that is 
the other strategic benefits associated with the aid should be small. That is to say, it's 
very hard for donor countries to achieve and retain allies in the anti-terrorism war, while 
at the same time threaten the recipient countries to curtail aid if they are not able to use it 
effectively. Jenick and Krepl (2006) found foreign aid contributed in economies 
transformation and formulation of the development policy in many countries, such as 
Botswana and South Korea in the60s, Indonesia in the 70s, Bolivia and Ghana at the end 
of 80s, Uganda and Vietnam in the 90s.There is, however, just as much evidence to 
suggest that foreign aid is inefficient. Boone (1996) measured aid effectiveness by 
human development indicators, finding no significantly positive relationship. Boone 
explained that foreign aid is not economically effective because the politicians were 
more likely to conduct distortionary policies when receiving aid flows, which would 
cause or enhance poverty. Another interesting thing he found is that democracies and 
liberal regimes did not allocate aid any differently from other regimes. 
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Other critics on foreign aid include aid dependency and aid fungibility. According to 
Thomas (2001), a country is aid dependent when it cannot perform many of the core 
functions of government, such as delivering basic public services like schools and 
clinics, without foreign aid. Tandon (2008) and Brautigam (2000) summarized the 
negative effects of aid dependency, including the loss of policy autonomy, less 
transparent and accountable of budgets, and unpredictability of long-term planning due 
to the volatility of aid flows. Aid dependency used to be a very serious problem before 
2000, but is has fallen sharply in the recent years (Thomas et al., 2001). In addition, 
Collier (1999) contested five propositions related to aid dependency; he contradicted all 
five propositions and hence cumulatively contradicted the central belief of aid 
dependency in theory. Aid fungibility is yet another problem. Foreign aid intended for 
socio-economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive sectors, 
such as military sector. Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998) empirically examined the 
relationship between foreign aid and expenditures in public sectors, finding no 
fungibility in the aggregate level but sectoral fungibility (aid for agriculture, education, 
and energy) existed. Recently Sijpe (2010) pointed out evidence is meager to indicate 
that aid for education and health is fully fungible. Due to limited sample scopes in 
previous researches and contradictory discoveries, we cannot draw a firm conclusion 
with respect to the fungibility of sectoral aid. 
   The previous papers about foreign aid are mainly focused on the aggregate level and 
its effectiveness to reduce poverty; not many paid attention to aid on the sectoral level 
and its effectiveness to reduce conflict and violence. It’s understandable because: (1) 
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only country-wise data of foreign aid by sector from 2002 is available by OECD, as a 
result, previous researchers must suffer the limitation of number of countries observed 
when studied this issue; (2) along with some other goals, the most important goal of 
foreign aid before 2000 is to improve welfare of humans in the poor countries, this 
situation has been changed after the September 11 attack, that keeping global peace has 
become as important as welfare improvement. 
    Among a few papers regarding aid by sector, Sachs (2005) emphasized aid for basic 
health care in order to fulfill the millennium development goals (MDGs). Morgenthau 
(1962) and Azam et al. (2003, 2010, 2007) argued aid for government administrations to 
adopt a Western philosophy of politics may not be very beneficial in blunting threats 
from radical and impoverished societies. They also argued that military intervention 
would not decrease the threat of terrorism, instead they advocated for increased foreign 
aid for education. Keen (1994) and Soysa et al. (1999) affirmed that foreign aid for 
agricultural development is the most important facet for development, as it can 
successfully reduce hunger, thereby reducing conflict and violence. Messer et al. (1998) 
agreed with them, and he mentioned particularly that agricultural aid may play an active 
role in those societies that are vulnerable to conflict. On the other hand, a great deal of 
literature illustrates the detrimental effects of agricultural aid and food aid on economic 
development (Moyo, 2009; Waal, 1989; Stewart, 1993; Barrett, 2001). But the critics are 
chiefly directed towards the implementation process, rather than to food and agricultural 
policies. The above representative analysis is not related to mitigating conflict and 
violence but to reducing poverty. However, plenty of conflicts and violence are caused 
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by extreme hunger or poverty. Their discussions do provide a start platform for the 
following analysis. As for the sector-by-sector analysis on aid’s impacts of international 
peace, there are some non-academic reports written by researchers in political science 
(Young and Findley, 2011; Anderson and Spelten, 2000). Young and Findley suggested 
aid for education, health, governance and civil society, and agriculture have a negative 
influence on the count of international terrorist attacks, that is to say, intra-country 
violence. Still an examination of sectoral foreign aid in mitigating conflict and violence 
deserves more attention in the foreign development literature. Also, Shahriar (2011) took 
one key subcategory from every general sector, finding that aid for agriculture and food 
security could mitigate conflict and violence whereas aid health has a positive effect. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
the variables; Section 3 discusses the intervention strategies in conflict zones; Section 4 
presents the empirical results and policy implications; Section 5 discusses the error terms 
and the directions of causalities; and Section 6 offers conclusion and recommendations.   
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2. DATA AND VARIABLES 
The primary variables of interest in this thesis are intra-country violence, inter-country 
conflict and sectoral foreign aid data. Data on international conflict from 2002 to 2010 
has been made available through the Uppsala University database. This data is labeled as 
international conflict, because at least one government was involved in each of the 
conflict events. In order to reduce the impacts of large variance in the original data, the 
data was ordered by the Uppsala University database, considering the intensity of the 
conflicts. The intra-country violence data was collected from the Global Terrorism 
Database, University of Maryland. It includes violent events of assassination, hostage-
taking, armed and unarmed assault, bombing, explosion, attack on infrastructure and 
hijacking in all countries from 1970 to 2010. The intensity of violence in each country is 
measured by the total number of incidents per year.  
Sectoral foreign aid data for agricultural development, government administration and 
civil society, developmental food aid and food security programs, economic 
infrastructure and services, health and education was collected from the OECD database. 
Regrettably, the aggregate sectoral aid data at the country level is available only from 
2002. It should be mentioned that aggregate data on sectoral assistance from 1971 is 
available through OECD database. Yearly data for each aid receiving country was 
recorded. The aggregate foreign assistance data that reflects the combination of loans, 
grants, foreign direct investment and assistance were also collected in the OECD 
database. To better understand the underlying meanings and scopes of foreign aid by 
sector, definitions of each sectoral aid are listed as follows: 
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    Education: Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) of OECD defines aid 
to education as including education policy and administrative management, education 
facilities, and educational training and research. The definition is ranged from basic 
education, secondary education to post-secondary education. 
    Health: The DAC definition of aid to health as including basic health care, infectious 
disease control, health education and health personnel development, health sector policy, 
and other medical health services. 
    Government administration and civil society: The DAC defines aid to government 
administration and civil society as including institution-building assistance to strengthen 
core public sector management systems and capacities, departments of regional and local 
government, anti-corruption commissions and monitoring bodies, justice sector systems 
and procedures, as well as support to the exercise of democracy and diverse forms of 
participation of citizens during and beyond elections, human rights, and women's 
equality. 
    Economic infrastructure and services: The DAC defines aid to economic 
infrastructure &services as including support to infrastructure, policy making and 
training of transportation, storage, communications, energy generation and supply. Also, 
aid to banking and financial services is a part of this sector. 
    Agriculture: In DAC’s definition, “agriculture” has a broader sense, which consists of 
forestry and fishing. Aid to agriculture includes agricultural sector policy, agricultural 
land and water resources development, agricultural productions improvement, and 
agricultural training and research. 
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    Food: The DAC defines aid to food security as supply of edible human food under 
national or international programs including transport costs. Cash payments made for 
food supplies are also regarded as food aid. But emergency food aid is excluded. 
    Other:  Aid to water and sanitation, other social infrastructure and services, industry 
and mining, environmental protection, and non-food commodity assistance are included. 
However, aid to military is excluded. 
Combined with conflict and violence data, we use the sectoral aid data for 123 
developing countries from 2002 to 2010. In the following analysis, international conflict 
and intra-country violence are treated as the dependent variables. Conflict is measured 
by grades on the scale of death numbers, with higher grade indicating more intensive 
conflict events. The violence data comprises the count of terrorist events in a country 
over the period of a year. We report the cumulative max, min and average value of 
conflict and violence by country in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 Conflict Violence 
Cumulative Max  18 6,213 
Cumulative Mean 2.4553 178.8374 
Cumulative Min 0 0 
CumulativeStd.dev 4.7809 700.0913 
Number of observations 1,108 1,108 
 
 
 
    The sample size consists of 1,108 observations for each variable. Table 1 shows that 
from 2002 to 2010 the most conflict-prone country, which is India, has a cumulative 
maximum yearly conflict index of 18. The average cumulative grade for each developing 
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country is 2.4553, which means that at least 1,000 people died in battles in the given 
period. Iraq suffered the highest cumulative number of violent incidents caused by intra-
country violence is 6,213, while the cumulative average amount of incidents is about 179 
for each country. 
The independent variables for the regression analysis (performed in section 4) consist 
of aid for Education, Health, Government and Civil Society, Economics Infrastructure 
and Service, Agriculture (including forestry and fishing), and Food Security along with 
an aggregate estimate for foreign assistance for all other sectors. Table 2 presents the 
summary statistics of the independent variables by country. We make three interesting 
observations from table 2. First, most of the variables display a wide variation across 
countries. Second, on average, economic infrastructure and government and civil society 
obtain most of the money, while agriculture and food aid/ food security draw less 
money. The third point is that the signs of minimum value of Infrast and others are 
negative. OECD rather vaguely claims that the negative value comes from over spending 
a country’s development budget. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
 Educ Health Govern Infrast Agri Food Other 
Max 841.83 528.42 3,068.52 2,079.04 542.28 343.14 16,173.43 
Mean 53.88 33.47 69.49 87.92 27.38 9.48 356.62 
Min 0 0 0 -0.86 0 0 -0.57 
Std.dev 97.00 62.42 172.73 190.26 52.49 22.28 879.23 
Number of 
observations 
1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 
Notes: The numbers inside the table are in millions of U.S. dollars. 
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3. CASE ANALYSIS 
We initiate our quantitative analysis with graphical illustrations and discussions on the 
disbursement strategies of sectoral foreign aid. Figure 1 shows the total foreign aid 
allocated to education, health, government and civil society, economic infrastructure, 
agricultural development, and direct food security from 1971 to 2010. Aid to economic 
infrastructure has been consistently allocated the greatest amount of money. Although 
most of the developing countries have agrarian economies, from 1987 to 2006 the 
amount of agricultural aid has declined rapidly. Figure 2 depicts the percentages of 
sectoral foreign aid for 123 countries from 2002 to 2010, which will be further analyzed 
in the next section. Figure 2 is presented to give a first impression about the data to be 
examined. 
Compared to the decrease of agricultural and food aid from the late 1980s through the 
early 2000s, both international conflicts and intra-country violence have markedly 
increased. Figure 1 shows that funds for government administration and civil society 
have been increasing since 1999. This shift can largely be attributed to the realization by 
policy makers that foreign aid can be effective on the condition of good governance. 
Hence, foreign aid officials began to spend significant amounts of money to build good 
governance in conflict-prone nations. Figure 1 also depicts that aid for education has 
also significantly increased over time. Academics (Azam et al. 2004, 2003) have also 
argued that aid for education would convey the anti-war opinions to the young civilians. 
Thus, increased aid for education can lead to more peaceful livelihoods for the poor. 
Compared to aid for government and economic infrastructure, aid for health is increasing 
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rather slowly in the recent decade. Economic infrastructure and services have obtained 
the greatest share of assistance. Shahriar (2011) mentioned that middle and upper 
income countries with “good governance,” such as Brazil and the Philippines, receive 
most of their aid in the form of economic infrastructure and services. Aid for food 
security and food safety has been the lowest form of aid, because long term food 
programs are categorized in agricultural sector. Sectoral aid data for each developing 
country is not accessible until 2002. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Time trends of assistance from all donors disbursed by sector, 1970-
2010 (US$ millions) 
Source: OECD. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of foreign aid by sector for 123 countries, 2002-2010 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
3.1 Afghanistan Case 
Foreign aid is usually regarded as development assistance, so that military aid is 
excluded. However, military operations and aid for military sector are often employed in 
most conflict-prone countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Following figures are 
intended to compare the spending between military spending and non-military foreign 
aid spending in Afghanistan and Iraq. USA’s Department of Defense (DOD) expenses in 
Afghanistan from 2002 to 2010 are shown in Figure 3. This figure shows that DOD 
spending is several hundred–folds greater than foreign aid spent in Afghanistan. Belasco 
(2011) pointed out that DOD has spent $336 billion in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011, 
in other words, $92 million per day in Afghanistan. Yet, during the 10 years, 
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Afghanistan received $7.9 million per day on average. Moreover, Waldman (2008) 
reported that DOD spending comprises only one-third of the total U.S. military expense 
on Afghanistan. From figure 3, DOD spending was increasing exponentially; while 
foreign aid spending was increasing rather slowly and monotonically. 
However, the DOD also made efforts to recover economy and reduce conflicts in the 
conflict-prone areas. For example, in 2006 the U.S. DOD Task Force for Business and 
Stability Operations (TFBSO) was formed to achieve economic stabilization in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD (2008) stated it’s equally significant to shape the civil 
situation with its mission of “winning battles” on foreign countries.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Time trend graph of foreign assistance and USDOD war spending in 
Afghanistan (US$ millions) 
Source: OECD, Belasco (2011). 
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Figure 4 reveals that official development assistance (ODA) comprises only 3% of the 
total resources allocated to Afghanistan. ODA is a term coined by the OECD to measure 
foreign aid. Waldman (2008) reported that since 2001, Afghanistan received $57 per 
capita aid, while Bosnia and East Timor, after their intervention, received $679 and $233 
per capita, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of DOD and ODA spending for development assistance in 
Afghanistan, 2001-2010. 
Source: OECD, Belasco (2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates the trend of sectoral aid in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2010. Aid 
for government and civil society administration has consistently been increasing and 
receives most resources. Since governance and civil society have been identified as very 
weak in Afghanistan, donors are inclined to invest more funds to build democratic 
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government and strengthen civil society. Yet, Waldman (2008) criticized that aid for 
government did not work well because of inadequate government human capacity and 
widespread corruption in Afghanistan. Aid for economic infrastructure was increasing 
until 2009, but it has a sharp decline in 2010. Food aid seemed to be neglected, although 
85% of the total household income in Afghanistan was spent on food (Chelala 2008). 
Aid for agriculture was increasing rapidly after 2008, which may be caused by a serious 
hunger happened in Afghanistan in the early 2000s. Aid for education and health has 
been marginal, too. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sectoral aid trends in Afghanistan, 2002-2010 (US$ million) 
Source: OECD, Belasco (2011). 
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Figure 6: Aid to Afghanistan by sector, 2002-2010 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that food for education, health, agriculture, and food security 
comprises less than 20% of the total foreign aid. On the other hand, aid for government 
and civil society and aid for economic infrastructure comprises about 50%. The rest one-
third of foreign aid was allocated to the other sectors, such as energy, water and industry. 
We can reach the conclusion by figure 5 and figure 6 that aid for government and 
infrastructure drew far more attention than aid for agriculture, education, health, and 
food security during 2002-2010.   
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3.2 Iraq Case 
The graphical analysis of Iraq provides a similar alarming picture. Belasco (2011) 
pointed out that DOD has spent more than $800 billion in Iraq from 2002 to 2010. Most 
of the DOD spending was allocated in building governance, infrastructure, and economic 
stabilization. Figure 7 shows that DOD expenditure was increasing since 2003, but has 
declined after 2008. The ODA, which is a convenient indicator of foreign aid, reflects a 
similar trend in this figure. However, the amount of foreign aid is miniscule compared to 
DOD spending. The poor in Iraq received $159 per year during this period, which is less 
than average level in developing countries. Furthermore, Iraq’s per capita aid ranks 47th 
among all developing economies in 2000s. If we only consider countries with more than 
2 million populations, Iraq ranked 12thin aid recipients. 
Figure 8 shows the trends of selected sectoral aid in Iraq. Most of the resources were 
allocated to government and civil society in 2005. In 2006 and 2007, economic 
infrastructure received most funds of total aid. Compared to other sectors, these two 
sectors has led foreign aid from 2002 to 2010. However, there’s a decreasing trend for 
every sectoral aid after 2006. Apart from government and economic infrastructure, aid 
for other sectors seemed to be neglected, especially for agriculture and food security. 
According to a report from United Nations, the malnutrition among children had doubled 
to 8% by 2005 (BBC, 2005). The report said that “The hungry in Iraq should be at the 
top of donors’ lists; instead, they seem to be at the bottom”. 
    Figure 9 shows that from 2002, food security and agricultural development comprise 
only 1% of the cumulative non-military aid disbursed in Iraq. Aid for education, health,  
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Figure 7: Time trend graph comparing aid and defense spending in Iraq, 2002-2010 
(US$ millions) 
Source: OECD, Belasco (2011). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Sectorial aid trends in Iraq, 2002-2010 (US$ millions) 
Source: OECD. 
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agriculture, and food security together received less than 5% of total aid; whereas aid for 
government and economic infrastructure obtained almost one-third of total aid. A special 
point of Iraq’s case is that aid to other sectors comprises two-thirds of total aid. It’s  
because a large amount of money was allocated in the energy sector to facilitate Iraq’s 
oil production recovery. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Foreign assistance by sector in Iraq, 2002-2010. 
Source: OECD. 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We estimate a linear panel model for each dependent variable:  
 
F (Conflict/Violence) =β1Educe+β2Health+β3Govern+β4Infrast+β5Agri+β6Food+β7Other 
 
4.1 Conflict Model 
Table 3 shows the results of estimation results of sectoral foreign assistance on 
international conflict. We portray the results of fixed-effects linear panel model (PLM), 
pooled OLS model (Pooled OLS) and one year lagged linear panel model (Lagged PLM) 
respectively. Table 3 depicts the effect on international conflict while table 4 portrays 
the effects on intra-country violence. Our data set contains 123 developing countries, 
each of which includes nine observations measured for nine year period. Thus, our data 
are balanced, cross-sectional and time-series. It is necessary to employ linear panel 
model to investigate the coefficients of variables. As a simple gathering of data, Pooled 
OSL of course is subject to many types of errors. However, it can be used as a more 
basic means of analyzing the data compared with other more sophisticated approaches. It 
is of interest to check whether the fixed-effects are needed. This is done by comparing 
the fixed effects PLM and the Pooled OLS fits by means of F test. The F static is 18.15 
and p-value is close to zero, so we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance 
level, indicating there is substantial inter-country variation. Hence we do need the PLM 
fixed-effects regression.  
    We do not use random-effects method because the omitted variables are assumed to 
be correlated to the independent variables. The Hausman test compares the fixed versus 
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random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the other regressors in the model. Based on Hausman test, the chisq = 32.3723, p-value = 
0.000035. Since the p-value is smaller than 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis and 
choose fixed-effects instead of random-effects. 
It can be argued that to capture the real effect of sectoral assistance, one should study 
the lagged values of foreign assistance in different sectors. For example, agricultural 
programs and policies undertaken in 2002 may take a year to take effect and decrease 
conflict/violence in 2003. Therefore, a lagged PLM would permit us to construct the aid 
effectiveness analysis in a longer term.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Regressions of Sectoral Foreign Aid on International Conflict 
Model: 
Variable 
PLM   Pooled OLS Lagged PLM 
Intercept         0.1205***  
Educ             -0.0001 -0.0003  -0.00007 
Health   0.0008 *        0.0016***  0.00021 
Govern       0.0005 ***        0.0007***       0.00039*** 
Infrast  0.0001*    0.0003*    0.000073 
Agri             -0.0007*  0.0001       -0.00088 ** 
Food             -0.0002         0.0045 ***  -0.00059 
Other      -0.00005***   -0.00003       -0.000029 * 
Notes:*, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
    Under the assumption that aid will affect conflict and violence in the recipient 
countries, we next discuss the estimated relationship between the explanatory variables 
and international conflict and inter-country violence. 
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    Education: Controlling for all other types of major assistance, the estimated 
coefficient of education is negative but not statistically significant. One year lagged 
PLM model shows that the relationship between education and international conflict is 
positive but still insignificant. We will not discuss the lagged effects of each variable if it 
is not statistically significant in the following analysis. 
    Health: The estimated coefficient of health is positive and marginally significant at 
the 10% level for conflict. But the Pooled OLS shows that health is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. It’s suggested that investment in health will increase 
international conflict among developing countries. 
    Government and Civil Society: Similar to health, aid for government and civil society 
is positively and significantly related to conflict at the 1% level. The positive association 
between government and civil society and international conflict is even stronger than 
that between health and international conflict. Moreover, the effect is positive and 
significant in the one year lagged estimation. 
    Economic Infrastructure and Service: The estimated coefficient of infrastructure is 
again positive and marginally significant at the 10% level. The results of aid for health, 
government and civil society, and economic infrastructure suggest that underlying 
implementation process and allocation policies for those three sectors need a complete 
review. 
    Agriculture: PLM shows that the estimated coefficient of agriculture is negative and 
marginally significant at the 10% level. According to one year lagged PLM, its negative 
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effect become stronger at the 5% level. It is concluded that agricultural assistance 
successfully mitigates international conflict. 
    Food Security: Aid for food is negative but insignificant related to international 
conflict. Yet the Pooled OLS shows that food is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. We cannot determine the relationship between food aid and conflicts.  
Other Sectors: Aid for other sectors has a negative and statistically significant effect 
on conflict in both PLM and lagged PLM.  
 
4.2 Violence Model 
Table 4 shows the effects of foreign aid on intra-country violence. Similar to table 3, 
column PLM shows the linear panel model estimation in fixed effects, column Pooled 
OLS shows the pooled linear estimation of foreign aid on violence, and column Lagged 
PLM shows the longer term (one year lagged) regression results. Again similar to the 
previous analysis, we show that the fixed-effects PLM model is better than Pooled OLS 
by comparing the fixed effects and the pooled OLS fits by means of F test. The F static 
is 8.4291 and p-value is close to zero. So the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that 
the fixed-effects model is better than the pooled OLS model. To trade off fixed effects 
and random effects, I use the Hausman test with chisq = 18.0964, and p-value = 0.01154 
which is smaller than 0.05. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis and choose 
fixed-effects instead of random-effects. 
    Education: Aid for education is found to be positive and significantly related with 
violence at a 1% level. However, the futility of education aid may be attributed to lag 
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time effects. Foreign aid may take time to take effects and achieve their intended results. 
Lagged PLM shows that education aid significantly decreases violence at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Regressions of Sectoral Foreign Aid on Intra-country Violence 
Model: 
Variable 
PLM Pooled OLS Lagged PLM 
Intercept    -6.111**           -5.678 ** 
Educ 0.212*** 0.001           -0.072 * 
Health           -0.022   0.180 *** 0.238*** 
Govern 0.138***  0.323*** 0.340*** 
Infrast             0.020  0.076*** 0.141*** 
Agri 0.381***             -0.008            -0.067 
Food           -0.261 **  -0.546*** -0.656*** 
Other           -0.008***  -0.011 *** -0.008 ** 
Notes:*, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
     
 
    Health: The estimated coefficient of health is negative but not significant for violence. 
But the Pooled OLS and Lagged PLM show that health is positive and significant at the 
1% level. Since aid for health will increase both international conflict and intra-country 
conflict, its aid policies need substantial revision. 
    Government and Civil Society: Similar to health, aid for government and civil society 
significantly increases conflict at the 1% level in both PLM and lagged PLM. From table 
3 we find that aid for government would also increase international conflict. Thus, it’s 
necessary to review aid policies in this sector. 
    Economic Infrastructure and Service: The estimated coefficient of infrastructure is 
positive but not significant. In the long term, however, infrastructure is positive and 
significantly related to violence at the 1% level. 
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    Agriculture: The estimated coefficient of agriculture is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Yet Pooled OLS and Lagged PLM present an opposite and 
insignificant relationship between agricultural aid and violence. Aid for agriculture may 
decrease violence in the longer time, but at a relatively short period, it will not reduce 
violence. 
    Food Security: Aid for food is negative and statistically significant related to violence 
in both PLM and lagged PLM. It’s interesting that the lagged negative effect of food aid 
on violence is stronger than that in the PLM model. Since food aid is intent on providing 
healthy food directly to the people in poverty and nothing to do with the long-run 
development strategy. 
    Other Sectors: Aid for other sectors has a negative and statistically significant effect 
on violence in both PLM and lagged PLM.  
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5. ERROR TERMS AND CAUSALITY DIRECTIONS 
It is reasonable to expect the error terms to be correlated within variables, and we even 
cannot drop the possibility that different sectoral aid might affect each other. It is also 
difficult to determine the directions of causality between conflict/violence and the 
explanatory variables. One reason is that causality may run in both directions. Foreign 
aid might mitigate conflict and violence by decreasing hunger and poverty and 
increasing economic development. On the other hand, foreign aid provided in conflict-
prone countries might alter existing power relationships by delivering resources, thus aid 
can become instruments of conflict. 
 
5.1 Revised Conflict Model 
Table 5 shows the tests for conflict models. I used Breusch-Pagan to test the 
heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis in the Breusch-Pagan test of cross-sectional 
independence is that residuals across entities are not correlated. The static value of Chi 
Square at the 5% significance level is 14, which is smaller than our calculated Breusch-
Pagan value. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis. There is cross-sectional 
dependence in conflicts models. Durbin-Watson is used to assess autocorrelation in 
regression relationships. Under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, the test statistic 
should be in the vicinity of 2. We see that for PLM model, DW=1.4145. If we choose a 
5% significance level with n =100 and k = 7,dL= 1.508 and dU= 1.826. DW<dL, we 
reject the null of no serial correlation against the alternative of positive serial correlation 
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at the 5% level.  However, for Lagged PLM model, DW=1.553, which is greater than dL 
but smaller than dU. Therefore, the test for Lagged PLM is inconclusive. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Tests Analysis Models on Inter-country Conflicts 
 PLM Pooled OLS Lagged PLM 
Testing for heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan 
value 
33.8892 33.8892 40.3936 
p-value 0.00002 0.00002 0.000001 
Testing for autocorrelation 
Durbin-Watson 1.4145 0.5803 1.553 
p-value < 2.2e-16 0.7606 1.295e-12 
 
  
 
To obtain better unbiased estimators, I apply dummy variables to the original model to 
remove both country effects and time effects. The new model is:  
 
F(Conflict/Violence)=β0+β1Educe+β2Health+β3Govern+β4Infrast+β5Agri+β6Food+β7Ot
her+α1C1+ α 2C2+…α121C121+α122C122+ð1T1+ð2T2+…ð7T7+ð8T8 
 
The new variables Ci and Ti are dummy variables taking the values 0 or 1 to indicate 
the absence or presence of country-effect and time-effect that are expected to shift the 
outcome. Table 6 depicts the results of revised conflict models. A big difference between 
the revised table and table 3 is that I replace the Pooled OLS by an Ordered Probit 
Model. As a simple reference, Pooled OLS is no longer useful at this point. And the 
ordered probit model could be used as an examination of PLM because the dependent 
variable, conflict, is rankly graded by 0, 1, and 2. 
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    After adjusting for endogeneity, aid for agriculture and other sectors are found to have 
a significantly negative association with international conflicts, while aid for health and 
government administration are significantly positively related to conflicts. Educational 
aid and food aid may reduce conflicts but the results are not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Revised Conflict Models 
Model: 
Variable 
PLM Ordered Probit Lagged PLM 
Intercept   -0.0641338   
Educ            -0.0000571 -0.0007579 -0.0000042 
Health        0.0008561**    0.0041927* -0.0000562 
Govern          
0.0005384*** 
       
0.0024117*** 
      0.0004561*** 
Infrast    0.0001377 0.0003767  0.0000323 
Agri            -0.0006728* -0.0038881      -0.0009604** 
Food            -0.0002026 -0.0010521   0.0006254 
Other      -0.0000512** -0.0002142    -0.0000317* 
Notes:*, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
The causality directions can be investigated by using an error correction model (ECM) 
and directed acyclic graphs (DAG) (Bessler, 2003). Before applying the error correction 
model, figure 10 in appendix shows causality directions based on raw data at the 5% 
significance level. It shows that conflicts are directly caused by aid for government 
administration and maybe caused by aid for health. It’s a little surprising that other 
sectoral aid cannot directly cause conflicts.  Bessler explained the theories of ECM and 
DAG. Generally, the causal information between error terms across variables can be 
retrieved by the variance -covariance matrix of residuals. Then I use DAG to represent 
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the causal flows among variables by using arrows.  Figure 11 illustrates the 
contemporaneous causality directions with both country-effect and time-effect removed. 
Figure 11 should be analyzed together with the results of revised fixed-effects PLM 
conflict models in table 6. The contemporaneous conflict –government aid and conflict- 
health aid relationships are statistically significant, but the causal directions are not as 
same as we suppose. While the sectoral foreign aid is interacting among each other, 
conflicts cause aid for health and government administration. 
 
5.2 Revised Violence Model 
Table 7 shows the tests for violence models. The static value of Chi Square at the 5% 
significance level is 14, which is smaller than our calculated Breusch-Pagan value. 
Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis. There is cross-sectional dependence for 
violence models. I use Durbin-Watson test to assess autocorrelation in regression 
relationships. Under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, the test statistic should be 
in the vicinity of 2.If we choose a 5% significance level with n =100 and k = 7,dL= 
1.508 and dU= 1.826. Our calculated DW statics are smaller than dL, indicating that we 
can reject the mull hypothesis that the residuals to be uncorrelated with the regressors in 
all time periods. Similarly, I add country dummy variables and time dummy variables to 
remove both country and time effects.  
    The revised results are shown in table 8. From table 8, we learn that aid for education, 
government administration and agriculture has a significantly positive association with 
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intra-country violence. Aid for food security and other sectors is significantly negative 
related to violence.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Tests Analysis Models on Intra-country Violence 
 PLM Pooled OLS Lagged PLM 
Testing for heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan 
value 
294.356 294.356 297.2022 
p-value < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 
Testing for autocorrelation 
Durbin-Watson 0.6754 0.5957 0.8282 
p-value < 2.2e-16 0.7606 < 2.2e-16 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Revised Violence Models 
Model: 
Variable 
PLM Lagged PLM 
Intercept           -2.291  
Educ       0.2096577***      0.1005149*** 
Health -0.0318893 0.0187554 
Govern       0.1393153***      0.1552494*** 
Infrast  0.0182753      0.0898698*** 
Agri       0.3736233***      0.2980532*** 
Food    -0.2866563**    -0.2856768** 
Other      -0.0082196***    -0.0051895** 
Notes:*, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
    As discussed above, it is well-known that the causal flows could be different before 
and after adjusting endogeneity. To obtain a more reliable contemporaneous causality 
direction, figure 12 shows the DAG after removing country and time effects at the 5% 
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level. Figure 12 shows that no sectoral aid can cause violence. On the contrary, violence 
will cause aid for government administration and agriculture. And the relationship 
between violence and educational aid is uncertain. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical examinations of the relationship between conflict/violence and foreign aid by 
sector are important so that policymakers will know if and how to use foreign aid to 
achieve peace in developing countries. This sector-specified analysis is seldom made 
before due to data availability. So the author of this paper hopes to show some 
significant results at the sector-level about foreign aid for researchers and policy makers. 
    Before adjusting endogeneity, foreign aid for agriculture and food security have 
negative relationships with conflicts and violence, and aid for education, health, 
government administration and economic infrastructure is positively related to conflicts 
and violence. 
    Once accounting for endogeneity, aid for health and government administration is 
positively associated with international conflicts, and aid for education and government 
administration is positively related to intra-country violence. One reason for this result is 
the aid for those sectors is not properly directed and executed, thus, leading to "theft 
effects" and "distribution effects". By "Theft effects", resources are often transferred by 
(military) authorities to support their agenda for international conflict. By "distribution 
effects", aid is given to some people and not to others, for example, more aid is allocated 
into the urban area than rural area, reinforcing the economic inequalities and thus, 
reinforcing the intra-country violence. 
    After accounting for endogeneity, agricultural aid is found to have a negative 
relationship with conflicts, and food aid is negatively related to violence. It can be 
explained that most of the developing countries have agrarian economies with a plenty 
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of people suffering hungry problems. Aid for agriculture and food security is best fits the 
national conditions of recipient countries. Through the case study and regression 
analysis it was evident that agricultural development and food security assistance is 
much needed, under allocated and not valued. Of course, for some severe conflict-prone 
nations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, all sectoral foreign aid is needed. 
    We end with the recommendation to promote agriculture and food security assistance 
through novel programs. In the appendix we present results on the graphical structure of 
conflicts, violence and foreign aid. There we have learned that conflict causes aid for 
government administration, and violence causes aid for government administration and 
agriculture. However, I did not explore the dynamic causal relationships behind these 
variables. Further dynamic causal structures need to be examined before a conclusive 
statement can be offered. Thus, I place the directed graphs in the appendix.  
    Another future work should explain and evaluate foreign aid for other sectors, such as 
aid for energy. Although no previous paper analyzed the relationship between 
conflict/violence and other sectoral aid, a more comprehensive result may strength our 
understandings on foreign aid. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Causality directions of conflict and sectoral foreign aid based on original data 
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Figure 11: Causality directions of conflict and sectoral foreign aid  
(Both country and time effects removed) 
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Figure 12: Causality directions of violence and sectoral foreign aid  
(Both country and time effects removed) 
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